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CONSTRUCTING A RELIGIOUS WORLDVIEW: 
WHY RELIGIOUS ANTIREALISM IS STILL INTERESTING
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University of Augsburg
Abstract. After a short overview of anti-realist positions within the philosophy 
of religion, the following paper argues in favour of a moderate version of religious 
anti-realism. especially the notions of ‘revelation’ and ‘religious experience’ 
seem to suggest that certain dichotomies (i.e. the fact/values dichotomy) that are 
typical for realism cannot be upheld consistently within philosophy of religion. 
However, the end of the paper shows a different route, which might overcome 
the realism/antirealism dichotomy as such.
I. WHAT Are We TAlKING AbouT?
A  very prominent definition of theistic/theological antirealism turns 
out to be somewhat inadequate. michael Scott and Andrew moore, 
for instance, have introduced the following prima-facie insightful 
distinction:
Theological realism is the theory that there is a  transcendent divine 
reality, the principal object of religious belief and language, the existence 
of which is not contingent upon (or, positively, is independent of) our 
thoughts, actions and attitudes. Theological non-realists maintain that 
meaningful religious faith and language are possible without there being 
any such independently existing entity.1
Scott’s and moore’s definition of ‘theological non-realism’ is, taken at 
face value, not a description of theological or religious anti-realism, but 
1 michael Scott and Andrew moore, ‘Can Theological realism be refuted?’, Religious 
Studies, 33 (1997), 401-418, esp. 402.
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rather an explication of atheism, cloaked in a version of non-realism. It 
is pretty obvious that only a certain fraction of contemporary philosophy 
of religion wants to be associated with that sort of non-realism, which is 
pretty much the same thing as what we should call ‘irrealism’ (a point of 
view we will deal with in a couple of paragraphs). It is not wrong to offer 
this sort of narrow definition of non-realism. unfortunately, however, 
this definition leads to a  rather unwelcome consequence: It blurs the 
lines of the differences in anti-realistic concepts within philosophy 
of religion, since too many philosophical approaches that are fond of 
anti-realism are pushed towards irrealism and, at the end of the day, 
are predominantly interpreted as ‘irrealist’. but this is neither fair nor 
correct. only a few authors – literature on that topic usually mentions 
Don Cupitt, but we need to be careful with that assessment2 – fulfil the 
description as an approach that turns anti-realism into irrealism.
Certain confusions in labelling might tell us that we are in need of 
a  sharper distinction of different types of antirealism especially in the 
area of theology and philosophy of religion. Therefore, it would be 
beneficial to introduce Crispin Wright’s term3 ‘irrealism’ and Simon 
blackburn’s phrase4 ‘quasi-realism’ to our vocabulary; but we have to use 
those terms with a grain of salt when it comes to philosophy of religion. 
Thus the following definitions are rather stipulative than explicative or 
descriptive by referring back to the leading philosophers that might have 
coined the phrase in question.
Friendly irrealism should be seen as a  position that holds certain 
ontological commitments under certain circumstances to be empty; 
we could think of philosophers like ludwig Feuerbach, who don’t 
believe in the existence of God, but still think that religious language 
is meaningful if, for example, re-interpreted from a certain perspective, 
since religious God-talk is the result of a misleading reference shift that 
ascribes idealized properties to an  individual entity called God while 
the properties in question must actually be ascribed to an abstract entity 
2 Cf. Don Cupitt, Taking Leave of God (london: SCm Press, 1980). For further 
discussions compare Peter byrne, God and Realism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 107-
125, esp. 109-118.
3 Cf. Crispin Wright, ‘realism, Anti-realism, Irrealism, Quasi-realism’, in Saving 
the Differences: Essays on Themes from Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge: Harvard 
university Press, 2003), pp. 11-47.
4 Cf. Simon blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism (oxford  – New York: oxford 
univerity Press, 1993).
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called mankind.5 Contemporarily, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer’s approach 
could be seen as a version of friendly irrealism with regard to religion.6 
Although Stekeler-Weithofer doesn’t actually believe in the existence of 
God, he is able to treat religious language as a system of symbols keeping 
an  honourable and very dignified image of human nature, which has 
the fascinating capacity to transcend its very own boundaries, alive.7 
Another, equally sophisticated form of friendly irrealism can be found 
in markus Gabriel’s remarks on religion. To him the phrase ‘God’ is more 
or less a symbol or a placeholder for the infinity of social relations we 
may (theoretically) encounter as finite human beings.8 but there is no 
additional meaning to the phrase ‘God’ – at least not in the ways classical 
theism may have pictured it. 
Hostile irrealism, on the other hand, would agree that the ontological 
commitments of religious sentences are empty, but would add that we have 
no justification to treat religious utterances as something meaningful. 
Sigmund Freud’s position might come close to hostile irrealism, since 
he regards religious propositions as the fallout of psychological facilities 
that aren’t always properly aimed at healthy or truthful goals.9
Quasi-realism, instead, should be defined as the position that ascribes 
rationality and, therefore, cognitive value to religious utterances, but 
would insist that religious sentences do not have truthmakers in a way 
statements about the physical world have; while statements about the 
physical world are ‘made true’ (and, of course, one needs to ask whether 
or not this is a meaningful phrase as it stands) by physical states of affairs, 
for religious quasi-realism there are no comparably well-identified 
‘religious’ states of affairs (consisting of specifically religious entities or 
entities that instantiate specifically religious properties) that could work 
as the requested truthmakers.
5 Cf. ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christentums (Stuttgart: reclam, 1969 [rP 
2011]), pp. 52-79.
6 We may also wonder whether or not friendly irrealism is the only positive answer 
an empiricist philosophy can give to the question of religion. Cf. Andrew moore, Realism 
and Christian Faith: God, Grammar, and Meaning (Cambridge: Cambridge university 
Press, 2003), pp. 41-43.
7 Cf. Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Sinn (berlin – New York: De Gruyter, 2011) pp. 43-70, 
121-144.
8 Cf. markus Gabriel, Warum es die Welt nicht gibt (berlin: ullstein, 2013), pp. 177-213, 
esp. 208-213.
9 Cf. Sigmund Freud, Die Zukunft einer Illusion (leipzig: Internationaler psycho-
analytischer Verlag, 1927).
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Thus, the first order of business should be to refrain from treating 
irrealism as a version of anti-realism. Irrealism is – plain and simple – 
the denial of the existence of certain types or certain tokens of being. 
You can thus be an irrealist about unicorns but a realist with regard to 
superstrings at the lowest micro-level of the universe. You can be a realist 
concerning everyday objects but an irrealist when it comes to universals, 
etc. Positions like that do not even touch the true motivation of anti-
realism as we should try to understand it. Something similar should be 
said for quasi-realism. Its immediate concern is the relation between 
certain statements and their presumed truthmakers holding on to the 
idea that states of affairs are rather peculiar entities most intimately 
related to the nature of facts.10 Quasi-realism may be combined with 
anti-realism and the other way round; but they shouldn’t be equated. 
In an unequivocal way, anti-realism needs to be anchored in the mind-
dependency-thesis. For this is what makes anti-realism most interesting 
and most controversial. Some support for this proposal may be offered 
by the other side of the spectrum. Therefore, William Alston’s explication 
of ‘metaphysical realism’ is quite noteworthy:
As a  preliminary characterization of the kind of metaphysical realism 
being considered here, it is opposed to the view that whatever there is, 
is constituted, at least in part, by our cognitive relations thereto, by the 
ways we conceptualize it or construe it, by the language we use to talk 
about it or the conceptual scheme(s) we use to think of it.11
So, we have to raise the question: What is anti-realism in the philosophy 
of religion? To come up with a  satisfying answer it might be helpful 
to turn to a  more general characterization of anti-realism as such. 
Following raimo Toumela, who offers a survey of the most basic anti-
realistic convictions, we can name seven different ‘symptoms’ that lead 
to an anti-realistic approach:
10 I am aware that this is a very charitable interpretation of quasi-realism. In literature 
we also find the idea that quasi-realism is always accompanied by fictionalism. And 
one may wonder whether or not fictionalism is disastrous to the self-understanding 
of religious expressions and their commitments. Cf. David lewis, ‘Quasi-realism is 
Fictionalism’, in Fictionalism in Metaphysics, ed. by mark Kalderon (oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2005), pp.  314-321; a  critical response to that comes from Simon blackburn, 
‘Quasi-realism No Fictionalism’, in Fictionalism in Metaphysics, pp. 322-338.
11 William P. Alston, ‘What metaphysical realism is Not’, in Realism and Antirealism, 
ed. by William P. Alston (Ithaca – london: Cornell university Press, 2002), pp. 97-115, 
esp. 97-98.
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(1) The analytic-synthetic as well as the scheme-content distinction 
in the traditional sense should be abolished (cf. Quine).
(2) The myth of the Given should be rejected (cf. Sellars).
(3) It is central to make the distinction between naturalistic (non-
epistemic) and epistemic discourse or, if you prefer, between the 
order of being and the epistemic order (cf. Sellars).
(4) The assumption of psychological nominalism is correct, viz., all 
awareness of abstract entities is at bottom a  linguistic affair (cf. 
Sellars).
(5) language and justification are social and historical affairs (this 
comes from pragmatism).
(6) There is no strict fact-value dichotomy to be made at least on the 
level of ordinary language (pragmatism, hermeneutics).
(7) The main goal of philosophy is edification and conversation 
(hermeneutics).12
Not all of these items on the list have to go into your cart if you want to 
buy in to anti-realism. especially (7) represents a rather metaphilosophical 
conviction, as Tuomela points out,13 which is not required to be 
an antirealist although some prominent antirealists in the more general 
areas of theoretical philosophy (take, for instance, richard rorty) or in 
the rather special area of philosophy of religion (a  paradigmatic case 
would be D. Z. Phillips) would sign off on (7). However, the heart of 
the anti-realistic creed is written down in sentences (2)-(6). but still, 
these theses report only symptoms of anti-realism (or descriptions of 
symptoms that are, indeed, extraordinarily helpful in identifying anti-
realism in the history of philosophy and in contemporary debates) but do 
not show the core of anti-realism which, to my estimation, must consist 
of a more or less elaborate rejection of a global or, at least, regional mind-
independency-thesis. but still, the above-mentioned symptoms are very 
helpful in drawing the lines between anti-realism and irrealism since 
neither of those sentences implies subjectivism or non-cognitivism or 
the straightforward denial of the existence of God. That some friendly 
irrealists might take advantage of one or the other of these characteristics 
of anti-realism is a matter of fact but not a matter of necessary entailment. 
12 raimo Tuomela, ‘The myth of the Given and realism’, Erkenntnis, 29 (1988), 181-
200, esp. 191.
13 Ibid., pp. 191-192.
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Analogically, there is the possibility of combining anti-realism with 
quasi-realism when it comes to the notion of truth and the ‘notorious’ 
truthmaker question (as some would say); but only a few of the above-
mentioned criteria  – especially (4) and (5) which, by themselves, are 
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions of anti-realism  – connect 
directly to quasi-realism. A  strong link between irrealism and quasi-
realism in religion can be established if we take a more or less empiricist 
interpretation of factualism as the ultimate starting point.14
Given that Tuomela’s checklist dates back to the times when the 
realism/antirealism controversy originated, one might wonder whether 
or not this list is still accurate. So, for example, the realist might not 
want to have the ‘myth of the given’ strapped to his back (see item (2) 
on the list). And, equally, the antirealist might not want to be associated 
with versions of ‘psychologism’  – or whatever could be linked to that 
notion – and the like (compare item (2) of Tuomela’s list). Given that 
there are more subtle versions of realism15 and antirealism available in 
the meantime, Tuomela’s list needs improvement. With respect to more 
recent discussions of the topic, the following list might serve as a better 
litmus test of (metaphysical) antirealism. Therefore, let us suppose that it 
is typical for antirealism:
(1) to be opposed to the fact-/value-dichotomy as well as the content/
attitude- and the content/form-dichotomy,
(2) to treat reference as an affair that essentially reflects a speaker’s 
attitudes and convictions (which implies to be critical about 
a causal theory of linguistic reference) and to treat justification as 
linguistic and, therefore, cultural affairs,
(3) to criticize a  connection between truth and justification that is 
too loose (while emphasizing that truth is idealized justification),
(4) to reject a correspondence theory of truth in favour of coherence 
in order to treat ‘truthmaking’ as a predominantly linguistic and 
logical affair,
14 For a deeper analysis of these connections compare michael Scott, ‘Wittgenstein 
and realism’, Faith and Philosophy, 17 (2000), 170-190, esp. 174-177.
15 It is up for discussion whether any version of realism that does not hold equally 
strong antitheses to what Tuomela has pinned down as the antirealist’s Creed might turn 
into ‘blind’ realism. See robert Almeder, ‘blind realism’, Erkenntnis, 26 (1987), 57-101. 
Presumably, a blind realist might be opposed to items (2) to (4) on my new list of criteria, 
which shows that blind realism is a significantly weaker position than straightforward 
metaphysical realism.
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(5) to be deflationist with regard to the common truthmaker talk 
(since this is seen as the last outpost of the correspondence theory 
of truth),
(6) to point out that there is not just one language/conceptual system 
that can be justified as the solely correct description of the world,
(7) to be nominalist and/or pragmatist about abstract entities (like 
universals, rules, laws, etc.).
This list is still just an enumeration of certain symptoms that are quite 
typical for an antirealist position. but the core-conviction is not even on 
the list yet. It is the idea (as indirectly presented by Alston’s definition of 
metaphysical realism) that the mind-independency-thesis is wrong.
II. FlAVourS oF relIGIouS ANTI-reAlISm
With some of the above developed distinctions in mind it becomes quite 
interesting to take a second look at the notorious role models of religious 
anti-realism, especially D. Z. Phillips, Gordon Kaufman and John 
Hick. There is the unanimous conviction within the realistic camp of 
philosophy of religion that Phillips’s, Kaufman’s and Hick’s views contain 
the leitmotif of anti-realistic opposition to realism. but what does this 
mean specifically?
In Phillips we find the idea that there are no unequivocal standards 
of referring or justifying, so that religious language has to be treated 
differently compared, for example, to scientific language:
The whole conception [...] of religion standing in need of justification 
is confused. of course, epistemologists will seek to clarify the meaning 
of religious statements, but as I  have said, this means clarifying what 
is already there awaiting such clarification. Philosophy is neither for 
nor against religion: ‘it leaves everything as it is’. This fact distinguishes 
philosophy from apologetics. It is not the task of the philosopher to 
decide whether there is a God or not, but to ask what it means to affirm 
or deny the existence of God.16
16 D. Z. Phillips, The Concept of Prayer (london: routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), 
p.  10. I  took the quote from this book on purpose since it belongs to the early stage 
reflections of Phillips’s position. His later stage writings are, of course, more elaborate 
and more outspoken when it comes to the explication of his antirealistic position. The 
leitmotif, nevertheless, stays the same.
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Admittedly, certain aspects in Phillips’s writings tend sometimes towards 
irrealism with regard to very specific commitments – take for instance the 
concept of prayer as the idea of asking or begging God for something – but 
it would be way too harsh to say that Phillips is an irrealist regarding the 
existence of God. In many of his writings he reflected on the question of 
what will follow for us once we agree that there is no unequivocal notion 
of existence so that God’s existence cannot be asserted and justified on the 
same basis as sentences which affirm the existence of electrons, dinosaurs 
or genes. In the way Phillips approached the problem, religious anti-
realism starts with the most fundamental insight that ‘to exist’ and ‘to be 
real’ and other phrases of this kind are extremely sensitive with regard to 
the subject they are predicated from. Furthermore, none of those phrases 
are interchangeable. In order to find out what we mean by those phrases 
we have to take a  look at the context of meaningful communication – 
a  context in which especially our actions in combination with our 
linguistic behaviour reveal the specific meaning of existence-claims. 
Within this framework an antirealist reconstruction of the ontological 
argument (as famously proposed by rush rhees) might be developed out 
of the idea that one doesn’t understand the meaning and impact of the 
word ‘God’ as the ‘Id Quo maius Cogitari Nequit’, if one pretends to have 
understood the meaning of ‘God’ as the IQmCN and simultaneously 
claims the non-existence of God. As a matter of fact, Phillips’s position is 
not so much that of anti-realism, let alone irrealism, but rather an attack 
on naïve religious realism and an  attack on philosophies that, in the 
name of an overall applicable realism, are willing to oppose theism on a, 
as they pretend to do, purely scientific basis.
Now let us turn to our second example: Gordon Kaufman. In his 
classic monograph God: The Problem, he introduces what we need to 
call religious quasi-realism since we find an apophatic overtone in his 
message. As a  conclusion he presents the idea that the word ‘God’ is 
a symbol:
The word ‘God’ not only designates a transcendent reality never accessible 
to our observation or even our speculation; it also implies an ordering 
of the world in personalized and purposive terms. Though God himself 
may escape our every attempt to search him out, the world that we can 
and do experience can be apprehended as his. That is, we can perceive it 
and live in it as created by God and ordered to his purposes, though we 
may not be able to prove either that this is in fact true of the world or that 
God does himself exist.
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The matter may be compared to the convergence of a  number of 
main highways toward a city lying some distance off the map. There is 
an order in the converging lines which can be clearly perceived, but the 
ground and center of that order (the point of intersection) is not open to 
view. We can, if we choose, orient ourselves and our travels by reference 
to the supposed city off the edge of the map, even though we have no 
further chart that actually shows that the city is there or just what are its 
contours and character.17
This analogy is as revealing as helpful since it tells us that Kaufman is in 
one way or the other bothered with factualism; and indeed factualism 
is what nourishes Kaufman’s version of quasi-realism. We can give his 
main intuitions the following argumentative outline:
i. The reference of a proper name is not problematic if and only if 
the referent is a distinguishable object located in time and space.
ii. The referent of the word ‘God’ is not located in time and space.
iii. Thus, the reference of the proper name ‘God’ is problematic.
From iii. Kaufman derives the insight that it is necessary for us to treat 
the word ‘God’ not as a proper name at all (but as a symbol). The hidden 
agenda of anti-factualism becomes obvious once we replace key phrases 
like ‘proper name’ with ‘sentence’, ‘referent’ with ‘truthmaker’ and the 
‘location in space and time’ with ‘(empirical) state of affairs’. It is now 
easy to see why Kaufman offers religious quasi-realism as a  way out: 
He gives credit to the more or less positivist doctrine which assumes 
that some main constituents of states of affairs need to be entities 
that are embedded in space and time. of course, Kaufman does not 
want to give up the rationality of religious language and the business 
of theology, which is connected to it. Therefore, a detour seems to be 
necessary: Given that our actions and our behaviour are seated in space 
and time, God-talk becomes relevant once it is reconstructed in a way 
that makes the connection between the symbol and our actions obvious. 
There are no physical states of affairs that are immediate truthmakers of 
sentences containing the word ‘God’ in an affirmative sense; but they are 
indirectly important insofar as they enter as facts into human actions 
and behaviour. of course, the easiest philosophical answer to that would 
be to say that Kaufman’s initial premise is wrong and that his notion of 
17 Gordon D. Kaufman, God: The Problem (Cambridge: Harvard university Press, 
1972), pp. 96-97.
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facts gives a restricted version of factualism too much credit. So – is that 
all there is to religious quasi-realism?
For Kaufman, quasi-realism has two main advantages: If it is combined 
with some straightforward concept of anti-realism, the claims of 
factualism can themselves be remodelled in anti-realistic terms, i.e. they 
belong to a certain worldview which rests on human conceptualizations 
and constructions.18 Furthermore, anti-realism may be the engine that 
keeps a  critical hermeneutics of religious imagery going. If we regard 
a  large number of traditional concepts of God as results of human 
means of conceptualization, we might feel entitled to critically review 
those images and even replace them. but such a  replacement couldn’t 
be successful, if the premise of every interpretation of religious language 
was irrealism. only by believing in an ultimate reality does a reform of 
our concepts of God make sense:
If God is understood as the serendipitous creativity manifest throughout 
the cosmos  – instead of as a  cosmic person  – and we humans are 
understood as deeply embedded in, and basically sustained by, this 
creative activity in and through the web of life on planet earth, we will be 
strongly encouraged to develop attitudes and to participate in activities 
that fit properly into this web of living creativity [...].19
It is open for discussion whether or not Kaufman’s ultimate concept of 
God (which itself is the product of some sort of ecoliberation Theology) 
might turn into irrealism or not. For our present goal it is enough to see 
that religious quasi-realism as the justification of critical hermeneutics 
will provoke almost naturally a theological opposition. but is this party 
that resides at the other side of the spectrum really opposed to quasi-
realism?20 Again, most of the time religious irrealism seems to be the 
danger many want to avoid right from the start in eradicating every form 
of anti-realism.
18 Cf. Gordon D. Kaufman, God: The Problem, pp. 203-225.
19 Gordon D. Kaufman, ‘mystery, God, and Constructivism’, in Realism and Religion: 
Philosophical and Theological Perspectives, ed. by Andrew moore and michael Scott 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 11-29, esp. 27.
20 Sometimes, indeed, it is irrealism which is under attack. And some other times 
it is what one usually calls ‘constructivism‘ (usually including a  rather odd notion of 
constructivism). An  interesting example is Katherine Sonderegger, ‘The Character 
of Christian realism’, Scottish Journal of Theology, 57 (2004), 451-465, who directly 
confronts realism and anti-realism based on the claim that an idea of a mind-dependent 
reality is untenable. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see that the author is not engaging in 
an argument here but simply claims that one must accept realism, cf. ibid., p. 452.
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let us turn finally to our last example usually assessed as a version of 
religious/theological anti-realism. In John Hick’s Interpreting Religion we 
find the idea that the ultimate reality is beyond the scope of our knowledge 
and understanding21 so that most, if not all, of the religious expressions 
we encounter turn out to be more or less adequate symbolizations meant 
to deal with an  ultimate that cannot be approached. It is crystal clear 
that Hick’s philosophy of religion sticks to metaphysical realism when it 
comes to the existence of the ultimate.22 but, what about the rest? A closer 
look will show that Hick’s approach is a  version of negative theology, 
since he strictly denies that religious expressions can be taken literally 
because of our lack of knowledge. The structure of his argument can be 
pinned down in the following way:
(1) reliably assertive sentences, which are open to truth-evaluation, 
presuppose sufficient knowledge of the entity the sentences are 
meant to refer to.
(2) We do not have sufficient knowledge of God, since God as the 
ultimate reality is beyond any means of gaining knowledge.
(3) The required presuppositions of assertive religious language 
cannot be fulfilled.
We may question the connection between sufficient knowledge and 
reliable assertion right from the start, while saying that reasonable belief 
will do. Still, this argument does not support religious anti-realism 
directly although it may well be said that some sort of expressivism fits 
perfectly into this picture. but this is just a  contrastive expressivism, 
which is not applicable to the very existence of the ultimate itself. 
Additionally, theological quasi-realism might fit this picture as well: If 
Hick’s epistemology forces us to steer away from any form of causal 
theory of linguistic reference, religious language needs to be based 
on a  different foundation. The Wittgensteinian idea of language as 
a  rule-governed enterprise comes in sight and would render theology 
a  hermeneutical science occupied with the unfolding and explication 
of the rules in question.23 but, obviously the resulting version of quasi-
realism coming from this merger between Hick and Wittgenstein is by no 
21 Cf. John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion (london: macmillan, 1989).
22 Cf. roger Trigg, ‘realism and Antirealism’, in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, 
ed. by Philip l. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro (oxford: blackwell, 1999), pp. 213-220, 
esp. 218-219.
23 Cf. Andrew moore, Realism and Christian Faith, pp. 75-79.
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means fictionalistic because a fictionalist assessment would presuppose 
a view from above which, according to Hick and Wittgenstein, we don’t 
have. Furthermore, rules of language have an objective status although 
it makes no sense to ask whether or not they can be ratified by certain 
truthmakers.
III. A mIND-DePeNDeNT reAlITY
After this brief overview over different versions and flavours of 
anti-realism we need to get our head around the quintessential mind-
dependency thesis. before we open the door for two strains of arguments, 
we need to take a closer look at some serious attacks on religious anti-
realism. These attacks did not originate from the realistic camp but come 
from philosophers that are, to a  certain extent, sympathetic to anti-
realism (at least in specific areas). The first attack says that anti-realism 
is just too easy a way for religious commitments to weasel away from the 
ontological and epistemological burden of proof. In a scarcely cloaked 
cynical manner Simon blackburn underlines that religion cannot 
keep up its demands and obligations if its language is reconstructed 
predominantly in an anti-realistic way as a system of symbolic language 
and performative rites.24
The second attack comes from philosophy of science indicating 
that religious and theological anti-realists have underestimated the 
returning strength of scientific realism and should, for their own good, 
deal with the question of whether or not theism has any explanatory 
power and whether or not it is necessary to treat God like a theoretical 
entity in natural sciences. This attack continues to say that any kind of 
scientific anti-realism that takes scientific progress as a litmus test for the 
performance of sciences must stick to the criterion of the explanatory 
power of an  entity whose existence is uncertain but whose treatment 
‘as if it existed’ is validated by its explanatory role. otherwise this 
endorsement of anti-realism would fall prey to the problems the first 
attack indicated: it would be too easy a way out of the forces of theistic 
scepticism and atheism. both attacks reflect a strategy well known in the 
philosophy of religion: They want religious assertions to be interpreted 
24 Cf. Simon blackburn, ‘religion and ontology’, in Realism and Religion (see footnote 
19), pp. 47-59, esp. 56-59.
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realistically in order to open them to evidentialist scrutiny and atheistic 
criticism.25
What can we say about those attacks? Andrew moore votes for a big 
separation between the endeavour of science and the aims of religion and 
religious language.26 While the former is literally tied to the explanation 
of phenomena in the universe, the latter’s business is to see the world 
in a specific light, which for Andrew moore is the light of revelation.27 
Therefore, religious systems cannot be compared to scientific theories 
and the crucial role of certain entities, whose existence seemed to be 
postulated by religious systems, is not that of theoretical entities living 
up to the standards of best explanations.28 Furthermore, moore adds that 
religious or theological realism is under a lot of pressure itself, since – 
once the explanatory role of religion is conceded – it unavoidably starts 
competing with scientific theories with respect to the explanation of 
certain phenomena (like religious experience and other things one could 
take as indications for the existence of God).29
In addition to what moore has pointed out, we can add two more 
observations regarding the advantages of religious anti-realism: First 
of all, revelation is a concept that is, by all means, mind-dependent. In 
25 Cf. Alexander bird, ‘Scientific and Theological realism’, in Realism and Religion 
(see footnote 19), pp. 61-81, esp. 67-79.
26 Although I am in favour of this separation there might still remain some interesting 
parallels that are useful in describing what we mean by religious anti-realism. Take, for 
instance, the problem of under-determined scientific theories and the case in which two 
equally solid theories are consistent with the phenomena but, after all, we cannot decide 
whether one or the other is true (or in any meaningful way privileged over the other). 
This case can be construed as an argument in favour of anti-realism. Cf. lars bergström, 
‘underdetermination and realism’, Erkenntnis, 21 (1984), 349-365. The analogy could 
help us to see how different religious worldviews (although they do not have the status of 
theories, of course) are in accordance with the phenomena; but yet we may not be able 
to decide which one is true.
27 Cf. Andrew moore, Realism and Christian Faith, pp. 45-55.
28 Cf. Andrew moore, Realism and Christian Faith, p. 66: ‘I suggest that when they speak 
of God’s unobservability, theological realists make a category mistake by transferring the 
“grammar” of observation in the created realm to the creator. In the realm of created 
reality with which science deals, the “grammar” of observation implies practices such 
as prediction, experimental control, and – if we are realist – the ascription of truth to 
theories; by contrast, the “grammar” of theology involves believing and obedience. Thus 
I shall argue that though there is a sense in which it is proper to speak of God’s revelation 
as his making himself observable, this is not a making visible in the same sense in which 
electron microscopes make, say, genes visible.’
29 Ibid., p. 56.
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a  universe without rational subjects and without consciousness there 
could be no revelation. Additionally, from a purely epistemological and 
hermeneutical angle, revelation is a way of interpretation: treating certain 
texts or events as a measure of the encounter with the divine while those 
texts or events do not offer any proof of their divine origin that is beyond 
reasonable doubt. The history of the critique of religion may teach us 
that there is not a single text in any religious tradition whose existence 
and content cannot alternatively be explained in purely naturalistic 
terms (even if those explanations should require some acrobatic skills 
from the critic); the same goes for certain events that are assessed as 
normative and revelatory by a certain religious tradition. What religious 
anti-realism adds to the equation is what we should call the irreplaceable 
premise of faith. In the light of faith, which at least partially has to be 
reconstructed in doxastic and epistemic terms, the concept of revelation 
makes sense. In the light of faith we treat certain texts of events as if 
they were revealed although we are in no position to leave behind the 
interpretational help this concept is offering us whenever we reflect on 
the content and extension of revelation. The reality of revelation is that 
very concept which serves as an  irreplaceable tool to evaluate events 
or texts under the perspective of faith. To explain why this is tied to 
antirealism we can make use of what Hilary Putnam famously used as 
a starting point for his idea of internal realism: the distinction of primary 
and secondary qualities (as it goes back to Descartes and is found in 
a  number of empiricist writers). even if we might have to admit that 
there is no evidence for a complete disjunction of primary and secondary 
qualities parallel to the distinction between mind-independent and 
mind-dependent properties, we would still be left with the troubling 
question of whether or not there are religiously significant ‘revelatory 
properties’ that somehow supervene on physical properties in a law-like 
manner. The religious anti-realist would add that there won’t be any such 
revelatory properties ‘out there in the world’ since revelation is a concept 
that is meant to help us interpret the world of facts in a certain way.
That this is a  crucial point becomes clear once we take a  look at 
Kathrin Sonderegger’s version of what she called ‘Christian realism’. She 
says something about the interpretation of biblical texts and the notion 
of the universe being God’s creation:
The opening verses of Genesis are an image – or better, an archetype – of 
the very nature of reality: that our cosmos exists in relation to God; that 
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they belong together; that God is the willing origin of this cosmos; and 
the proper name for this relation is ‘creation’ and the proper character of 
our cosmos is ‘creaturely’. Now, there may be recognizable signs of this 
creatureliness in the cosmos itself: the apostle Paul appeared to think 
so. but there may not. Proper theological realism does not rest upon the 
claim that reality as created must show forth its creatureliness apart from 
Christian faith: Christian realism is not ‘mind or language independent’ 
in that sense. rather, the true character of our cosmos is revealed and 
depicted in the beginning of scripture; and the true character of the 
Almighty as creator is exemplified there. Proper Christian realism begins 
with these two themes.30
of course, one can have a realistic notion of creation. maybe this is the case 
if you try to find a rock-solid basis for the cosmological argument. but, 
of course there is also the possibility, even the need for an anti-realistic 
notion of creation. This one is in place whenever we add the premise of 
faith to our interpretation of facts – especially when the summation of 
facts results in a still underdetermined picture of the world. Sonderegger’s 
interpretation of the cosmos as God’s creation is precisely a version of 
an  anti-realistic notion of creation. There is nothing wrong with that. 
but it sounds like muddying the waters if one calls that ‘realism’ – even 
the addendum ‘Christian’ won’t make that more realistic in a meaningful 
sense of the word. What Sonderegger seems to aim at is the idea that 
beyond our symbols and concepts there is still the transcendent reality 
of God. So, at the end of the day she is concerned with irrealism. This 
becomes even more apparent when Sonderegger qualifies her version of 
‘Christian realism’ in ways that eventually resemble the characteristics of 
anti-realism:
Christian realism is not, in fact, a method and position as constructivism 
is. realism is not the starting point or axiom that construction is; nor 
is it an  epistemic or metaphysical theory. Christian realism is not 
a  theory at all. rather, it is something deeper, more primal, formative 
and indispensable than any theory or method could be. We might call it 
a ‘form of life’ if Wittgenstein’s term did not, ironically, signal irrealism to 
many commentators; and we might call it a ‘picture’ or ‘characterization’ 
should these terms, too, not appear to connote imagination or wish. We 
might call it consensus gentium (the consensus of the people), should 
30 Katherine Sonderegger, ‘The Character of Christian realism’, p. 456.
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that term of protestant scholasticism not suggest to us a wish rather than 
an acknowledgement; or ‘marks’, as of the true church, should that term 
not be so enmeshed in confessional polemics. It may well be that bishop 
butler’s aphorism – that every thing is what it is and not another thing – 
applies to realism as well: we cannot state it fully or precisely in any 
other terms. So G. e. moore viewed the ‘good’: it was both transcendent 
and primitive. The real is surely that, if anything deserves that claim. So 
Christian realism is ‘common-sense’, ‘rule of thumb’, ordinary or ‘close 
at hand’. It is pre-theoretical – if that did not sound so theory-laden – or 
the ‘given’ – if that were not even more theorybound from Kant forward. 
Christian realism is the reception of the world, the real world. Nothing 
less question-begging than that can be said.31
maybe what Sonderegger seeks to emphasize is that the Christian 
worldview is basic in the sense that we do not have to sit down and 
develop a theory about the world wondering whether and how we can 
privilege this theory over and above a rivalling one. maybe she thinks 
that a certain worldview – like the Christian one – emerges out of natural 
inclinations and not out of voluntary and deliberate consensus. Still, this 
doesn’t count against the mind-dependency thesis which is couched in 
the ‘premise of faith’ that elucidates a certain religious worldview.
The second addition (which might help us to see the advantages 
of religious anti-realism) stems from mark mcleod. It basically says 
that anti-realism can tolerate and bear contradictions without the goal 
to overcome these contradictions at the earliest convenience.32 Thus, 
a religious-antirealist might be willing to name the difference between 
a theistic and a naturalistic worldview, but she could live with a situation in 
which none of these competing systems or languages can be evidentially 
proven to be the only legitimate ‘description’ of the world. Given that there 
are certain convictions that turn into the concepts that we use to explain 
or interpret the facts around us, the differences between a naturalistic 
and a theistic worldview may turn out to be beyond dissolution in case 
the concepts in question have a pre-rational origin. In short: Anti-realism 
is a  way to deal with contradictions in presenting what we could call 
a Goodman-world (or, to use another phrase, a holistic worldview) in 
which each of the claims is well established and in keeping these worlds 
31 Ibid., pp. 452-453.
32 Cf. mark mcleod, ‘realism and Irrealism: A Dialogue’, in Realism and Antirealism 
(see footnote 11), pp. 26-40, esp. 30.
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separate by showing that an overarching Goodman-world or worldview 
is out of sight.
In a  methodologically more transparent way, mcleod’s hints were 
foreshadowed by Immanuel Kant. In his Kritik der reinen Vernunft he 
keeps the most noble thoughts of special metaphysics as ‘regulative 
ideas’ of pure reason33  – ideas reason is desperately in need of for its 
own sake. It is because of the underlying concept of a higher unity that 
these regulative ideas are so needed: The unity of the self in order to 
have an enduring and stable bearer of all thoughts and concepts,34 the 
unity of the world in order to have the order and the framework for the 
objects of experience to be given, and above all the unity of mind and 
world – given in the notion of God – in order to have a higher synthesis 
which eventually correlates mind and world. on the other hand, Kant 
tries to show that we literally run into dead ends once we try to find 
evidence for what is indicated in these ideas on the basis of facts that are 
presented by experience. based on facts we cannot decide whether there 
is a stable and enduring subject of experience. based on facts we cannot 
decide whether or not there is a whole world ordered and given to us 
that allows us to experience it and act freely in it.35 And based on facts 
alone we cannot say whether or not there is a higher government and 
the ultimate cause of the world we call God.36 Additionally, we run into 
the problems of contradiction. If we follow Kant, the notions of freedom 
and the idea of the causal closure of the world are incompatible but yet 
equally needed to understand the moral order on the one hand and the 
order of events in the world on the other. There is a contradiction here, 
which cannot be eliminated based on the rivalling concepts that are in 
place. So, the only way is to embrace anti-realism. but, especially the 
example of freedom shows that, for Kant, the concept we embrace as if it 
were real is not a fiction (in any inferior sense) but something objective 
that gets its normative status because we cannot avoid conceiving of us 
as free if we want to have a consistent understanding of the depth and 
moral dignity of our actions.37 Thus, from a certain perspective we must 
conceive of ourselves as being free and responsible agents. but from 
another perspective (especially when we need to take a look at the world 
33 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, AA 330-335.
34 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, AA 262-270.
35 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, AA 309-314.
36 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, AA 315-321.
37 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, AA 366-368.
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from a naturalistic point of view), we must treat mundane events as if 
they were parts of an  entirely closed causal chain. Anti-realism is the 
only way out if we cannot set aside one concept from the other. 
We can expand Kant’s anti-realism even to concepts that are needed 
in theology;38 take for instance the problem of divine foreknowledge and 
human freedom. Imitating Kant’s style we could say that both concepts 
are an  unavoidable and integral part of a  religious worldview: The 
idea of divine foreknowledge keeps God’s supreme sovereignty intact 
theologically and offers also a pillar stone of spirituality. If everything is 
foreknown by God, nothing is alien to him and everything there will be 
is already in his hands. Nevertheless, this idea puts a heavy burden on the 
concept of the openness of the future, which seems to be a prerequisite 
for (morally meaningful) human freedom. Thus, we cannot take away 
the idea of future events being not yet actual and us having a  major 
influence on the course of the world that lies ahead of us. If contradiction 
is unavoidable and resolvable only at the cost of abandoning one or the 
other concept, antirealism offers a helping hand: We are in a position 
to say that the contradictions that seem to fall upon us theologically 
(and even spiritually) are merely conceptual and that we are entitled to 
stick to both concepts or ideas as if they were true if we can show that 
these concepts are needed for the sanity of reason, the coherence of our 
actions, the integrity of our most fundamental convictions that contain 
the rulebook of our discursive commitments and so on.
Don Cupitt alludes to this very Kantian problem of the contradictions 
that might arise from irreplaceable but yet incompatible concepts of God:
[T]raditional theism makes three claims, as follows: 
(i) God is active; 
(ii) God is immutable; and 
(iii) God is in this life known only through his effects.
How can these three claims be reconciled? It would seem that if 
an account of God must be such that these three things can all be 
said of him, then something like our own account has to be given. 
For on our account God is not really a person or a substance but [...] 
an unconditionally demanding and inflexible principle which as we 
choose it and lay it upon ourselves generates certain effects within us; 
theistic faith, the drama of the spiritual life and so on.39
38 For a Kantian lead, cf. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, AA 457-461.
39 Don Cupitt, Taking Leave of God, p. 102f.
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Cupitt’s conclusion sounds admittedly like fictionalism. And we have 
to discuss the question of whether interpretation as some sort of 
construction entails fictionalism. However, we can start with Cupitt’s 
diagnosis of realistic theism and come up with a more Kantian solution: 
If for the sanity of reason and for the coherence of our moral and 
spiritual actions we need to think of God being active as well as of God 
being immutable, etc., and if those concepts turn out to be incompatible 
(especially when we take them at face value), we need to treat them as 
regulative ideas that reveal their indispensability by the means in which 
they orient our lives.
regulative ideas are of course mind-dependent because they 
crucially emerge from the activities of reason, especially from the inner 
dynamics of the cognitive powers of reason and its aim to find order 
and consistency. regulative ideas depend upon what we think cannot be 
thought otherwise; from here they gain their objectivity. Nevertheless, 
the world as sum of facts remains quite ambiguous once we try to identify 
the truthmakers of these ideas out there in the world. We establish the 
regulative ideas – including the idea of God – as if they were true40 still 
being aware that there won’t be any truthmakers available apart from 
our thinking. The ambiguity of the facts won’t go away – especially not 
once we raise the big questions about freedom, the substantiality of the 
self, the order of the world, the ultimate aim of the world, and God. but 
based on how reason itself performs we embrace those concepts as ideas 
that in the end govern how we interpret the facts and how we approach 
the world. From a  Kantian perspective we can embed the premise of 
faith into the premises of ultimate concepts that emerge out of reason’s 
dynamics towards the ultimate – having nothing but reason itself as their 
truthmaker.
IV. relIGIouS eXPerIeNCeS AND THeIr INTerPreTATIoN
but maybe the above-mentioned mixture of Kant with Cupitt is too 
much for the contemporary taste in philosophy of religion. The realistic 
opponent may still deny that a Kantian analysis which is combined with 
the notion of ambiguity of what we perceive to be factual is correct and 
convincing. Still, the opponent might want to see a convincing argument 
that helps her to see why anti-realism is the best we can get. maybe one 
40 Cf. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, AA 412-413.
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argument can help us out here, which could be called the argument from 
religious experience. The result might not be global anti-realism but, at 
least, a regional form of anti-realism which is still strong enough to be 
taken seriously.
of course, it is too global a question whether an adequate notion of 
experience as such leads to anti-realism. even if we want to avoid the two 
horns of the dilemma which a prima-facie reconstruction of experience 
might have in store for us, namely the myth of the given41 on the one 
hand and detached coherentism on the other, a mcDowellian solution 
to the problem, which consists in affirming that experience is as rational 
as it is conceptual, starting with the conceptual aspects of our openness 
for experience and their possible impact on the rational status of our 
convictions,42 won’t do for religious experience. There are too many 
loose ends in that very specific story since a huge variety of phenomena 
can serve as the experiential input to which an articulation of religious 
experiences is the result and since there is, strictly speaking, no specific 
input that could ever necessitate the articulation of religious experiences.43 
of course, there have been attempts to show that certain inputs will 
trigger certain religious propositions – take for instance Alvin Plantinga’s 
Warranted Christian belief; however such concepts are far from having 
established convincingly that a Conformity Principle of Perception (CPP), 
which holds that certain specific inputs will trigger certain propositions 
in every possible world that is inhabited by rational beings similar to us, 
is applicable to religious experiences. Since Plantinga sticks to (CPP) in 
one way or the other, the multitude of religious symbols and expressions, 
to his view, has to be traced back to severe malfunctions of certain 
41 For the discussion of an  intimate connection between the myth of the given and 
metaphysical realism see raimo Tuomela, ‘The myth of the Given and realism’ (see 
footnote 12).
42 This is how richard Schantz reformulates mcDowell’s position with regard to the 
problem of experience as merely being the cause of certain convictions. Cf. richard 
Schantz, ‘Wahrnehmung und Welt’, in Wirklichkeit und Wahrnehmung des Heiligen, 
Schönen, Guten: Neue Beiträge zur Realismusdebatte, ed. by elisabeth Heinrich and 
Dieter Schönecker (Paderborn: mentis, 2011), pp. 17-37, esp. 32-34, referring to John 
mcDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1994), pp. 14-18, 
137-147.
43 For further discussion on whether or not certain concepts of religious experience 
lead to anti-realism see Winfried löffler, ‘Die rolle religiöser erfahrung bei Swinburne, 
Plantinga und Alston’, in Wirklichkeit und Wahrnehmung des Heiligen, Schönen und 
Guten (see footnote 42), pp. 67-123.
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cognitive powers. but, actually, he is in no position to show why – for 
instance – Christian expressions of religious experiences are not equally 
subject to suspicion as are the outcomes of other, non-Christian religious 
traditions. His concept remains unavoidably hypothetical, even ad-hoc 
at that point.44
If we do not focus on the rather rare occasions of a more or less direct 
encounter with the ultimate (as some claim for mystical experiences) but 
on patterns of a more common way to introduce religious experience to 
the epistemology of religious belief we cannot take away the necessity of 
interpretation: Why is it that the night sky or the impressive skyline of the 
bavarian Alps inspire our sense of wonder and grandeur, and eventually 
lead to religious expressions? And why is it that some people might agree 
with our religious expression  – based on the very same signs  –whilst 
another might not? The case of religious expressions which are based on 
certain experiences cannot be compared to everyday sense perception – 
even if an  element of interpretation is still in place presumably at the 
most basic level of perception: Why is it that we all of a sudden interpret 
the appearance of a group of people as the appearance of the Simpson 
family, for instance, and not as the appearance of Homer, marge and 
their kids? Why is it that we see something as a townhouse instead of 
a two story building?45 but maybe nothing depends on those differences 
in interpreting something as something based on the concepts we have 
that rest on the convictions we share. In the case of religious experience, 
however, differences become crucial; they might accumulate to the point 
of disagreement while the disagreement cannot be settled on the ground 
that one interpretation of an event is true while the other is not. let us 
take, for example, a less ambitious and more common event – like the 
glowing of a mountain top during sunset. based on the premise of faith 
and the concepts that come with it, a religious person is motivated and 
justified in interpreting this event as a sign of the creator’s beauty given as 
gift to creation. but, equally, a non-religious person would be motivated 
44 For further discussions see Thomas Schärtl, Glaubens-Überzeugung. Philosophische 
Bemerkungen zur Erkenntnistheorie des christlichen Glaubens (münster: Aschendorff, 
2007), pp. 237-256.
45 For the German philosopher Günter Abel, the fact that even the most basic 
forms of experience are immersed in interpretation makes interpretation itself basic 
and unavoidable – with interesting consequences for metaphysical realism; cf. Günter 
Abel, Interpretations-Welten: Gegenwartsphilosophie jenseits von Essentialismus und 
Relativismus (Frankfurt a.m.: Suhrkamp, 1995), pp. 448f.
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and even justified to see the glowing mountain just a spectacular event 
provided by the central star of our solar system. religious experiences 
resemble experiences of beauty insofar as we are free to ‘have’ them – 
free not just in a voluntary sense but also in the sense of being free from 
an epistemic duty to see something as something. but perhaps some are 
inclined to think that this account of religious experience, which always 
leaves the door open for legitimate engagement or disengagement in 
interpretation, is too liberal a way of conceiving of religious experiences. 
However, the outlined aspects of freedom of interpretation cohere 
with the doxastic freedom that belongs essentially to religious beliefs. 
especially from a  theistic point of view, which sees faith as the initial 
step the finite creature takes in order to engage into a partnership with 
the divine beneficiary, the freedom of faith must remain an irreplaceable 
requirement. but if it is equally legitimate to interpret an  event as 
a religious experience and if it also legitimate to not interpret it that way, 
we are left with contradictions unless we embrace anti-realism again.
Not just religious experiences but also religious symbols are an integral 
part of a religious worldview. but religious qualities of events or things do 
not supervene on the physical properties of things and facts in a lawlike 
manner that can be logically pictured by a necessary implication. Pretty 
much everything can be filled with religious meaning while those who 
do not share certain concepts or do not add the premise of faith won’t 
detect anything meaningful.46
It may be the case that events and things offer something like 
a basic meaning they are at least opened up for (and this idea is highly 
disputable, but – for the time being – we might concede the notion of 
a basic meaning to the realist). Whether or not this is the case becomes 
quite irrelevant once we consider that religious meaning is placed at 
a  second-order-level of giving meaning to things at events. of course, 
there still might be first-order-meaning in religious contexts, maybe the 
existence of God or some instances of direct encounter of God (although 
in Kant and Wittgenstein we will find the idea that it is rather illusory to 
interpret the existence of God as a case of first-order-meaning of things 
or events) can be exemptions. but the richness of a religious worldview 
is not built upon the rather sparse confession that a  God exists and 
some people have encountered him. rather the richness of a religious 
46 Cf. Joseph runzo, World Views and Perceiving God (New York: St. martin’s Press, 
1993), pp. 67-93, 115-141.
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worldview depends on the many instances in which we ascribe (second-
order-)meaning to things and events: events can become the answer to 
a  prayer because I  see them like that while nothing in their mundane 
and physical layout dictates to treat them like an answer to my prayer. In 
a much larger scale the homecoming of Israel after the exile can be seen 
as an act of God although nothing in the physical and political layout of 
those events points to supernatural powers; in a non-religious worldview 
events like that can be traced back to rather mundane causes like the 
powers that be which somehow change their minds or select different 
political aims while setting those free that might have been under the 
burden of previous aims. Again, the premise of faith and the religious 
concepts we have guide our interpretation.
Perhaps not in every respect but for the most parts of religious 
worldviews we can say that they rest on acts of constructing a worldview. 
The term ‘construction’ has a very bad reputation because it insinuates 
that we make things up that have no basis ‘in reality’ or make 
an  interpretation out of thin air. but we shouldn’t be appalled by the 
phrase when something deeper is concerned: Interpretation is an act; it 
is simultaneously receptive and creative. especially at the level of second-
order-meanings the creative aspect outweighs the receptive aspect, 
although both aspects cannot be separated. Thus, we add interpretation 
to something, although this addition cannot be ‘clinically’ separated from 
what we try to interpret. The interpretation is like the light we need to see 
that Gestalt47 of facts – a Gestalt we attribute to the facts based on how 
we actively see the facts. The Gestalt that emerges is nothing that is not 
permitted by the facts or things we focus on; it has to be in accordance 
with them. but, nevertheless, the Gestalt is an  entity that gets its life 
from the relation we establish to things and facts by interpretation. In 
underlining the active side of interpretation and the mind-dependency 
of Gestalt we might as well call interpretation an act or a construction. 
of course, in drawing a parallel between interpretation and construction 
we must not think that interpretation is up for a  pure decision or 
47 I am using the phrase ‘Gestalt’ in a way Hans urs von balthasar has introduced 
this phrase to theological discourse. Cf. Hans urs von balthasar, Herrlichkeit, Vol. 1: 
Schau der Gestalt (einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1988). In short, it should be treated 
as an abbreviation to underline the fact that in seeing something we see something as 
something. In using this phrase I want to allude to the fact that there are only degrees that 
turn the case that two persons see something differently into the case when two persons 
see something different.
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depends on a consensus or is open to the powers of the highest bidder. 
That is not how interpretation works. Nevertheless, interpretations are 
parts of what Wittgenstein would have called forms of life – patterns of 
communication we share with each other (even at a subconscious, pre-
rational level). If engaging in communication and if using the patterns of 
communication that we have established in our forms of life can be seen 
as acting, we may be justified in underlining the pro-active, constructive 
side of communication.
V. SeArCHING For A broADer PerSPeCTIVe
maybe the above sketched remarks on antirealism are still premature. 
And maybe those positions are more accurate which think that the 
controversy as such indicates a  premature framework of thinking, so 
that – at the end – the solution of the debate is the dissolution of the 
premises that lead to the controversy in question.
From this angle, it makes sense to regard Wittgenstein’s view as 
a subtle paradigm that criticizes the very presuppositions of this debate 
and which tries to resolve the problems attached to the controversy in 
question from ‘within’48 (i.e. from within the execution of knowledge and 
the performances that language enables us to do). Seeing Wittgenstein 
as a role-model for overcoming the presuppositions of the controversy 
as such makes his view comparable even to Hegel who, in a speculative 
thread of mastery, tried to resolve the realism/antirealism-controversy 
from above as well as from below. Although it is not possible to chart all 
the consequences this approach has for the philosophy of religion, the 
Wittgenstein-Hegel alliance might serve as a silent warning or as a very 
strong reminder that the much invoked criterion of mind-independence 
is not in itself easy to grasp, let alone to describe and might eventually 
turn out to be devoid of meaning.
For in Wittgenstein as in Hegel we find an  interpretation of mind-
dependence that makes semantics and thinking the cement of the 
48 For a  non-Wittgensteinian undermining of the realism/antirealism controversy 
compare Werner Stegmeier, ‘Diesseits von realismus und Anti-realismus: Die realität 
der orientierung’, in Wirklichkeit und Wahrnehmung des Heiligen (see footnote 42), 
pp. 39-63. Werner Stegmeier’s approach is predominantly hermeneutical and semiotic. 
What is very interesting about his solution is the positive role played by reasoning and 
justification which actually shows that one can steer away from metaphysical realism 
without giving up the ideals of objectivity and cognitivity.
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universe – in a way that would render any concept of mind-independent 
reality truly useless and, even more so, meaningless.49 Their argument for 
attacking the realist’s concept of mind-independence would come down 
to the following (admittedly somewhat oversimplified) conclusion:
(1) If any answer to any question of existence depends crucially on our 
approach to what we think reality to be (like), there is no answer 
to questions of existence independent of the mind. [Premise]
(2) Anything we think reality to be (like) depends crucially on our 
approach to reality. [Premise]
(3) There is no meaningful answer to questions of existence 
independent of the mind. [From 1 & 2, mP]
of course the crucial premise is sentence 2). It would take another paper 
to get into the details of how Wittgenstein and Hegel might really justify 
this courageous premise. Some hints might suffice: Wittgenstein would 
point out that existence-statements (as any statements) are certain types 
of predication – which are, by the way, always in danger of being messed 
up with regular predications  – and that predicating is by itself a  type 
of language game that is governed by the structures of our language. 
However, it would be misconceived, according to Wittgenstein, to call 
this ‘interpretation’ since what we do in language is not just an addition to 
whatever we get in perceiving reality but is the way how perceiving works 
at any rate. These structures, Wittgenstein would add, are determined 
predominantly, if not exclusively, by our actions and the patterns of 
our communicative behaviour and not by certain facts reality might 
consist of – independently of our approach to reality and independently 
of our actions and behaviour.50 Nevertheless, these structures are not 
something that is thrown on reality like a net we use to capture the fish of 
experience (this might be a rather Kantian notion of epistemology) but 
emerge, so to speak, out of reality itself, since our actions and patterns 
of communication are integral parts of reality and cannot be separated 
antiseptically from what counts as objective reality ‘as such’. For, if we 
49 I  am grateful to Florian rieger for a  number of substantial discussions on 
Wittgenstein and Hegel. The point of comparison can be found in the major topics 
discussed in the Philosophical Investigations on the one hand and in the Wissenschaft der 
Logik on the other.
50 Cf. Gordon P.  baker and Peter m. S. Hacker, Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and 
Necessity: An Analytic Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 2 (oxford: 
blackwell, 1988).
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look for the pure ‘as such’ of reality apart from what our language does 
for addressing reality, we will end up empty-handed.
Hegel’s view, in contrast, is rather multi-layered. but in his 
Phenomenology of the Spirit we find quite a  number of initial hints 
that support premise 2) while turning the mind-independency-thesis 
from heads to tails: Hegel emphasizes, for instance, that no entity has 
an identity and thus can be approached as the individual instantiation 
of a  universal without a  necessary relation to consciousness and self-
consciousness. The way Hegel discusses these issues suggests that in 
a  world without consciousness a  significant account of identity and 
thisness would be impossible, since identity crucially depends on a mind’s 
capacity to identify something as something and since thisness depends 
on a consciousness’s ability to refer to something as something.51 but this 
is just one side of the story: It is as well the activity of the mind executed 
as consciousness and self-consciousness that provides entities with 
individuality, identity and thisness as it is the entity’s own substantiality 
which grants individuality and thisness. To say so is, indeed, applied 
dialectics which has the goal to overcome the unhealthy separation of 
reality and consciousness. Since the mind-dependency-thesis as well 
as the independency-thesis presuppose a  dyadic relation between the 
mind and the world, it is Hegel’s aim to undermine this very relation in 
emphasizing that there are no such hemispheres that could be separated 
antiseptically in ways that make the dyadic relation work. Therefore, 
whatever makes an entity an  individual or a substance is exactly what 
echoes within consciousness as the conceptually graspable essence of 
this very entity.
A consequence of both views might be to either abandon truthmaker 
talk (in a deflationist way) or to open truthmaker talk up to the idea that 
not only states of affairs but also substances, relations, properties and 
universals, and concepts can serve as truthmakers and can, therefore, 
constitute facts (seen as obtaining states of affairs in the broadest sense). 
51 Cf. for instance Georg W. F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (Hamburg: meiner, 
1988), p. 89: ‘es fällt hiermit das letzte Insofern hinweg, welches das für sich Sein und das 
Sein für anderes trennte; der Gegenstand ist vielmehr in einer und derselben rücksicht 
das Gegenteil seiner selbst; für sich, insofern er für anderes, und für anderes, insofern er 
für sich ist. er ist für sich, in sich reflektiert, eins; aber dies für sich, in sich reflektiert, 
ein Sein ist mit seinem Gegenteile, dem Sein für ein anderes, in einer einheit, und 
darum nur als Aufgehobenes gesetzt; oder dies für sich Sein ist eben so unwesentlich, als 
dasjenige, was allein das unwesentliche sein sollte, nämlich das Verhältnis zu anderem.’
159CoNSTruCTING A relIGIouS WorlDVIeW
Therefore, any notion of reference that is more or less bound to the 
model of naming spatiotemporal things leads us astray once we raise 
truthmaker questions enclosed in questions of reference. moreover, at 
least for Hegel, truth is a matter of revealing the conceptual side of states 
of affairs – which could be translated into the idea that states of affairs 
can serve as truthmakers only once they are seen as instantiations of 
universals that already serve as a bridge between the mind and the world. 
In a more sober way Wittgenstein would add that referring is not just 
one language game among others but a family of games resembling each 
other. Thus, what counts as a  fact depends crucially on the fact-game 
we are immersed in and the rules we apply. Therefore, the truthmaker-
question has to be rephrased into the question of whether the rules that 
govern our language game are meant to present something as a fact or 
as a given entity.
To this very brief sketch of Hegel’s and Wittgenstein’s most funda-
mental intuitions regarding the realism/antirealism problem, we could 
as well add a  short corollary introducing a more Putnam-like style of 
reasoning (which is, as it stands, not yet a deductive argument):
(1) If we meaningfully ascribe ‘existence’ to something, this ascription 
has to be reformulated in a way that reveals how we epistemically 
and semantically approach existence.
(2) If we reflect on the ways in which we epistemically or semantically 
approach existence, we need to treat this as a  version of the 
question of whether or not our concepts are empty.
(3) Concepts are mind-dependent.
It is not the goal of this paper to discuss the above-mentioned line of 
reasoning; we just should keep it in mind as a kind of warning telling us 
that the foundations of the realism/antirealism controversy are so tied 
to the most basic issues in philosophy that it might be appropriate to 
constantly question the meaning of the key terms involved.
As already noted, it is not so clear what this does for the philosophy 
of religion. For Hegel we can state that he takes the notion of God as 
a regulative idea of reasoning and puts it at the very centre of what is 
meant to be an objective reality which is, nevertheless, mind-dependent 
insofar as this idea reflects the absolute spirit which encapsulates every 
mind-gifted existence as such. What religion is dealing with becomes itself 
part of the self-reflection of this very spirit, and is therefore an objective 
reality but, of course, not in a  mind-independent way. but, actually, 
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this is not a problem for Hegel since the mind-independency thesis, as 
pointed out, has lost its grip on us and on the criteria that determine 
reality. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, could be seen as someone who 
voluntarily and subtly brackets the idea of an absolute spirit in order to 
make us aware of the sheer contingency of everything underneath this 
very idea. And thus, the point of philosophy may turn into a ‘religious 
point of view’ (to use Norman malcolm’s52 famous words) because it 
makes us aware that no God’s eye point of view exists underneath the 
idea of an absolute spirit – telling us that the realist’s desperation, which 
emerges from aiming at this God’s eye point of view without ever getting 
hold of it, is truly a religious attitude if taken as a reflection of the mark 
that contingency has put on us.
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52 Cf. Norman malcolm, Wittgenstein: A  Religious Point of View (Ithaca: Cornell 
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